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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 22/01/2004 Accident number: 4 
Accident time: 09:15 Accident Date: 28/09/1998 
Where it occurred:  Sabie, Maputo 
Province 
Country: Mozambique 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: ADP 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast Ground condition: not applicable 
Date record created: 11/01/2004 Date  last modified: 11/01/2004 
No of victims: 3 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
incomplete detonation (?) 
mechanical follow-up (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 




A UN investigation was carried out and the report made available. The investigators 
conducted interviews and took statements on 30th September 1998. The accident occurred at 
a minefield near Sabie [the exact location was not specified] where the demining company 
were supported by a UN controlled demining section (including dog handlers). They were 
contracted to conduct mechanically-assisted mine clearance in what was effectively a "shared 
contract".  
At 09.15 three deminers were injured when a mine detonated while being handled outside the 
mined area. Victim No.1 suffered severe hand and minor foot injuries. Victim No.2 suffered 
minor body and eye injures, and a hearing loss. Victim No.3 suffered a minor facial injury. The 
injured were taken by road (the report says that it would have taken too long to get official 
clearance for air evacuation) to Maputo Central hospital by 10:15. Victim No.1 was flown to 
Zimbabwe at an unspecified time for “follow-up treatment”. 
The Field Manager stated that he was not aware that deminers were trying to disarm mines 
[clearly thought likely at the time]. He added later that the group's SOPs state that damaged 
mines must be destroyed in situ and any fragments of mines should be placed in a collections 
pit.  
Victim No.2 stated that Victim No.3 asked Victim No.1 for a PMN2 mine casing to use for dog 
training. Victim No.1 gave him a mine case and started cleaning out sand from another, which 
exploded. He said that Mr Muronda got the mines from a group that were placed under some 
branches at the edge of  the minefield.  
Victim No.1 said he was carrying parts of PMN2s that had been broken by the machine 
"MIKE2" to a blast pit outside the mined area. In the blast pit were PMN2s and OZM-72s, 
some had been "thrown up" and others partially destroyed by the machine. He saw Victims 
No. 2 & 3 going through them and went to challenge them. They put some down but Victim 
No.3 still had one in his hand. Victim No.1 was bending to put the fragments into the pit when 
Victim No.3 dropped his mine and it exploded. Victim No.1 said that there were so many mine 
pieces after the machine had passed that he decided it was safer to move them to one place 
to destroy them. He said he would not move a live mine. 
Victim No.3 took immediate medical leave and did not return, so delaying completion of the 
inquiry. 
A witness said that Victim No.3 asked Victim No.1 for an empty casing for training dogs and 
Victim No.1 went to the pit to get the PMN2s. He had an empty mine in one hand and a 
damaged mine in the other. He tried to remove soil from the damaged mine and it went off. 
Conclusions  
A report of 12th October 1998 indicates that a UN board of inquiry was sceptical about Victim 
No.1's statement and believed that the probable sequence of events was that Victim No.3 
asked Victim No.1 to get a PMN2 casing for use in mine dog training. Victim No.1 collected 
two damaged mines, handed one to Victim No.3 and began to clean the other when it went 
off. From the scale of the injuries, the board concluded that the "blast resulted from the 
detonation of the mine's booster charge". It was thought unlikely that the main charge was still 
present. The board decided that the primary cause of the accident was the improper handling 
of a PMN2, which had been removed before being made inert. The board concluded that the 
demining group's procedures were sound although slightly ambiguous in places, and should 




Victim number: 5 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available 
(insured) 
Time to hospital: 1 hour 
Protection issued: Various Protection used: none 
 







No medical report was made available. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 6 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available 
(insured) 
Time to hospital: 1 hour 
Protection issued: Various Protection used: none 
 






No medical report was made available. The victim returned to work immediately after medical 
treatment in the field. 
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Victim Report 
Victim number: 7 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: dog-handler  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: none Time to hospital: 1 hour 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: none 
 




No medical report was made available. The victim was taken to hospital but the demining 




The victim was a Team Leader and so a member of the management chain. The demining 
organisation involved declared he was in breach of SOPs. The investigators refer to 
"ambiguity" in those SOPs. Victim No.1 claimed to have been behaving responsibly. The 
events indicate a failure of the command chain and an argument in the field (possibly 
because two organisations shared the contract).  
If the victim believed he was working properly by collecting damaged mines, there was a 
failure in his training or in the communication-chain. In this instance, revised training for the 
special circumstances of following a machine that left damaged mines was lacking. 
Knowledge of the operation of the damaged device was also lacking. The organisation has 
revised training, so implying a belated recognition of need (if not of previous “failure”). 
Training and selection of field supervisors is a management responsibility, so the primary 
cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy".  The secondary cause 
is listed as “inadequate training”. 
 
Related papers 
No Mozambican MAC/IND report was made available. 
Victim No.1 was encountered in the demining group's offices on 16th December 1998. He 
showed the stump of his amputation (at wrist) with some pride but was not willing to discuss 
the accident. He was still working for the demining group in another capacity. The dog handler 
involved in the accident (Victim No.3) had apparently still not returned, and Victim No.1 cited 
this as proof of his version of events. 
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